CIVIL SERVICE FEVER IN CHINA. AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SECTOR MOTIVATION AMONG PROSPECTIVE CIVIL SERVANTS by Tarnowski, Arthur Christoph
Faculty of Humanities
CIVIL SERVICE FEVER IN CHINA
AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SECTOR MOTIVATION AMONG PROSPECTIVE CIVIL
SERVANTS
by
Arthur Christoph Tarnowski
Thesis for the degree of Master of Arts
wordcount: 13860
s178989
a.c.tarnowski@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Supervisor: Professor Dr. Frank Pieke
June 2017
Contents
List of Figures 3
List of Tables 4
1 Introduction 1
2 China’s Civil Service System 3
2.1 Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 China’s Civil Service System today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Challenges for China’s Civil Service System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Theoretical Background 13
3.1 Public sector motivation versus
public service motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 Investigating the motivation of public servants in a non-Western context 19
3.3 Intermediate Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Research Design and Methodology 22
4.1 Survey Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1
4.2 Independent Variables and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2.1 Extrinsic motivators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2.2 Intrinsic motivators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.3 Altruism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.4 Prestige . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3 Demographic variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.4 Sample and Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.5 Descriptive Statistics of the sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5 Analysis results 34
5.1 Quantitative data: survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.1.1 Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.1.2 Public Sector Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.1.3 Controlling Demographic Variables: Gender and Hukou . . . . 38
5.2 Qualitative Data: Follow-up Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6 Discussion and Limitations 42
7 Conclusion 46
Bibliography 47
Appendix 53
2
List of Figures
2.1 Party control over personell management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3
List of Tables
2.1 China’s National Civil Service Exam. Development of applicants and
available posts (own illustration, adapted from: www.eol.cn, 2016) . . . 9
4.1 Descriptive statistics of the sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1 Cronbach’s Alpha results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2 Dimensions of public sector motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.3 Public sector job motivators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.4 Group statistics gender: dimensions of public sector motivation . . . . . 38
5.5 Group statistics hukou: extrinsic motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4
Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the reform of the civil service system in the 1990s, China encounters an annual
socioeconomic phenomenon that has come to be known as the ”civil servant fever” (Sun
and Gu, 2016: 2). With the start of the registration period for China’s annual civil ser-
vant exam (国家公务员考试), millions of students begin to prepare and compete for an
extremely limited number of government posts. In 2016, 1.38 million applicants com-
peted for 27,817 positions in the civil service; this implied a vacancy/applicant ratio of
33:1 (Chinagwy.org, 2016). Even though the number of applicants has decreased in the
recent years, one cannot observe a signiﬁcant cool down in the demand for governmen-
tal posts. In spite of the constantly reoccurring cases of corruption, the hierarchical and
authoritarian organization structure, and the relatively low salary it has to offer, the large
number of applicants illustrates the apparent attractiveness of the public service.
This study examines how these large application numbers come into being. In particu-
lar, it investigates the motivation behind a prospective Chinese civil servant’s choice of
career in the public sector: why do individuals want to work for the government? What
attracts such a large number of people towards pursuing a career in the civil service? Do
individuals have a unique motivation in serving the public as claimed by the theory of
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Public Service Motivation (PSM)? In other words, do public servants want to work for
the government because they are motivated to contribute to society or are other motiva-
tors predominant, and public servants are merely self-interested and beneﬁt-maximizing
individuals?
While the ﬁeld of public administration has shown considerable interest in public sector
motivation, most of its literature focuses on incumbent civil servants and not on prospec-
tive civil servants before they enter the civil service system. The neglect of this subject
is even more apparent in the East Asian context, and particularly, in the Chinese con-
text. As cultural and socioeconomic peculiarities in China affect society’s perceptions
towards the civil service system as well as positions within the civil service, ﬁndings on
public sector motivation in Western societies do not necessarily allow the formation of
conclusions on public sector motivation of the Chinese people.
Regarding the high numbers and the highly competitive application procedure for gov-
ernmental jobs, personnel managers might consider it unnecessary to study public sector
motivation in China; however, large numbers of applicants does not guarantee a high
level of public service motivation among prospective civil servants. Instead, people
working in public personnel management need to ﬁnd employees with a high level of
public service spirit. Public servants who are strongly motivated by altruistic factors,
such as helping contribute to society, and lesser extrinsic motives, such as a high salary,
stay motivated for longer periods of time and thus contribute to the overall efﬁciency of
the public service.
In order to shed light on the factors that drive people to pursue a civil service career, a
survey and follow-up interviews were conducted among the applicants who were prepar-
ing for the Civil Servant Exam of 2016.
2
Chapter 2
China’s Civil Service System
2.1 Development
At the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Com-
munist Party in December 1978, it was decided to launch the reform and open-door
policy (改革开放) that set off China’s economy and has come to be known as‘China’s
economic miracle’. Along with the economic transition away from the planned econ-
omy, new modes of governance became urgently required in order to meet with the
new challenges of a more liberal and market-oriented economic system. Improving the
accountability, the transparency, and the overall efﬁciency of China’s political system
became a core part of these reforms. Central to the reforming of China’s administrative
system was the introduction of a civil service system (Liou et al., 2014: 109). Before
the reform, China’s old cadre system was based on political career and loyalty at the
expense of criteria such as education, talent, and qualiﬁcation (The National People’s
Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 2005). With advanced economic develop-
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ment, however, the civil service’s work became more diversiﬁed, and the work and the
duties of public servants became increasingly specialized (Burns, 2007: 7).
At the 13th Party Congress in 1987, Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang proposed a new civil
service system as a part of the public administration reform. This proposal provided a
dual-track structure with public servants selected by meritocratic examinations. How-
ever, the proposal met with opposition and with Zhao Ziyang’s political decline, it was
removed as an aspect of the public civil service reform.1 Only in 1993, after Deng Xi-
aoping reinvigorated China’s economic reform agenda during his Southern Tour, was an
ofﬁcial civil service system ofﬁcially announced with ”Provisional Regulations on State
Civil Servants”. The aim of this systemwas to apply scientiﬁc management principles to
the civil service and thereby to develop a modern, merit-based civil service system. The
regulations addressed numerous aspects of civil service, including performance rewards,
discipline, promotion, payment, duties, and recruitment (Liou et al., 2014: 110). These
measure achieved visible success; according to Jing: ”Recruitment, training, retirement,
compensation, evaluation, and promotion of personnel were normalized gradually. Chi-
nese bureaucrats grew younger, better educated, and more professional” (Jing, 2010:
41).
2.2 China’s Civil Service System today
The provisional regulation was replaced by the ”Law of Civil Servants”, which came
into effect on January 1, 2006 (Liou et al., 2014: 110). An important difference from
1Pieke notes the sensibility of this issue at the time: ”[⋯] it included the radical proposal that the
party should relinquish its control over leading appointments in government [⋯]. If implemented the
proposal would have left the party with much reduced power to steer the evolution of Chinese politics and
society”. (2009, 33)
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its forerunner, the ”Provisional Regulation on State Civil Servants”, was the control
exerted over civil service. The ”Law of Civil Servants” empowered the Communist
Party to maintain ﬁrm control over the civil service system by reinforcing the traditional
principle of ”the Party managing cadres” (党管干部) (Burns and Wang, 2010: 60) as
stated in Article 4 of Chapter 1:
“公务员制度坚持以马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和三个
代表重要思想为指导，贯彻社会主义初级阶段的基本路线，贯彻中国共
产党的干部路线和方针，坚持党管干部原则”
(The civil servant system adheres toMarxism, Leninism,MaoZedong Thought,
Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the important ideas of the ‘Three Representa-
tions’; the civil service system takes these ideas as its guidance. It carries out
the primary stage of socialism as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s cadre
route and guiding principles, and adheres to the Chinese Communist Party’s
cadre administration principles)
(National People’s Congress, 2005; Own translation)
The practical application of these principles is being achieved through the structure of
China’s political system. The People’s Republic of China has designed a parallel struc-
ture between the party and the state, with party committees（党委）existing at all levels
of government (Figure 2.1). Sometimes, as Jing (2010: 39) notes, ”party and govern-
mental agencies are just one group of people with two signs—for example, the State
Council Information Ofﬁce and the CCP’s External Propaganda Ofﬁce”.
The law also deﬁned the term ”civil service”, and regulated who and which organiza-
tions were to be included in the civil service system: ”’civil servants’ should include all
5
Figure 2.1: Party control over personell management
employees who execute state functions (guojia gongzhi) according to the law and who
are hired according to the administrative establishment plan (xingzheng bianzhi), and
are paid by the state treasury” [italics in original] (Wang, 2012: 22).2 The adaption of
new criteria extended the scope of the number of people employed in the civil service.
While there were around 4.9 million civil servants in 2003, the number increased to 6.3
million afterwards (Chan et al., 2007: 389); as of 2016, it reached 7.17 million in 2015
(ifeng.com, 2016).3
2For an overview of all the units included in the civil service system in 2007, please refer to the work
of Wang et al. (2007, 385ff).
3Other scholars claim that the new criteria actually did not lead to the expected expansion of the civil
service owing to conﬂicting data and interpretation results from the different interpretations of the term
”civil servant” against other terms such as ”cadre” and ”ofﬁcials”. For an in-depth discussion on this
subject, please refer to Wang (2012: 21ff).
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2.3 Recruitment
Under the old cadre system, recruitment was overcentralized and ineffective. Candidates
were not selected and appointed in a competitive, fair, and open-recruitment process, but
were hired based on their loyalty towards the Communist Party (Pieke, 2009: 32) and
social class background. Furthermore, ”university students were assigned to some gov-
ernment jobs upon graduation, demobilized soldiers from the People’s Liberty Army
ﬁlled other government job positions, and cadres from factories or other public service
units, such as hospitals and schools, were transferred to ﬁll the remaining positions”
(Wang, 2012: 39). In government agencies, mismatches between candidates and po-
sitions often occurred. While candidates did not possess the required skills to perform
speciﬁc tasks in some positions, in other cases, they were insufﬁciently challenged by
their work (Wang, 2012: 39). In addition, chances for advancement or changing posi-
tion were limited. All this had negative consequences on the motivation of public-sector
employees.
It is thus not surprising that recruitment was identiﬁed as a key element of civil service
reform. After this identiﬁcation, the aim was to ﬁnd the ”best and the brightest” em-
ployees for the public sector and for each position within it. In order to achieve this,
the following nationwide standardized exams with merit-based criteria were set up: the
National Civil Service Exam (国家公务员考试), which is organized by the Organi-
zation Department of the Communist Party of China (中国共产党中央组织部), and
the Provincial Civil Service Exam (各省公务员考试), which is organized by the Orga-
nizational Departments of the respective provincial Party committees (各省省委组织
部).The national examination was institutionalized in 2001 (Li, 2016: 137) and is held
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once a year (in 2016, the written examination was held on 30 November); the provincial
examination, on the other hand, is held once or twice a year.4
Candidates who pass the National Civil Service Exam qualify to work in positions at the
central level, whereas successful provincial applicants take ofﬁce at the provincial level
(or below). Another difference concerns the difﬁculty of the exams, with the national
exam being more difﬁcult (Chinagwy.org). Applicants can enroll in both the exams as
often they want as long as they meet the minimum requirements; these requirements in-
clude being a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and holding a university degree.
Owing to the latter requirement, the number of civil servants holding university degrees
is continuously rising (Burns, 2017). Other requirements include age restrictions (appli-
cants have to be between 18 and 35 years), vacancy-related speciﬁc requirements as well
as‘softer requirements’ such as ”good morality” or the necessity to ”endorse the con-
stitution of the People’s Republic of China”, among others.5 The ﬁrst part of both exams
is a written examination. Successful test-takers are invited for an oral examination, and
depending on the available vacancy, they have to take specialized exams.
From the implementation of the modernized examination system, the number of appli-
cants had dramatically increased from 130,000 applicants in 2003 up to 1,520,000 in
2014; in the same time period, however, the number of available positions increased
from 5,475 to 19,538. The competition for public service posts became increasingly
ﬁerce, peaking in 2010 with an applicant–post ratio of 59:1. Only in the last two years
have the number of applicants stagnated while more governmental posts have become
available. From 2015 to 2016 alone, the number of available posts at the central level
4In his research on cadre management (2003–2007), Pieke (2009) only found provincial examinations
and examinations for speciﬁc posts. National examinations were only held in a few sites or on a trial basis
and people even in the organization departments never mentioned national exams.
5For a complete overview of the minimum requirements for enrollment in the 2016 Civil Service
Exam, please refer to (Zhonggong jiaoyu, 2018).
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has increased by 25 percent, while the number of applicants has only increased by three
percent during the same time period. Accordingly, through these years, the applicant–
post ratio arrived at the lowest ratio since 2004 (see Table 2.1). However, the applicant–
post ratio strongly depends on the respective post. The most popular vacancy attracted
9,837 applicants, whichmarks an all-time peak (China News, 2016). For other positions,
ﬁnding a proper candidate is more difﬁcult. Three days before the registration deadline
for the 2016/2017 exam, there were around 1,000 positions open that had not attracted
any applicants at all (Xinhua News, 2016).
Year Available posts (A)
Number of Applicants
(in millions)
Test-Takers (B) Ratio B/A
2016 27,817 1.39 930,000 33:01
2015 22,249 1.41 900,000 40:01
2014 19,538 1.52 990,000 51:01
2013 20,839 1.38 1,110,000 53:01
2012 17,941 1.3 960,000 53:01
2011 15,29 1.42 902,000 59:01
2010 15,526 1.44 927,000 59:01
2009 13,566 1.05 775,000 58:01
2008 13,787 0.8 640,000 46:01
2007 12,724 0.74 535,000 42:01
2006 10,282 0.54 500,000 49:01
2005 8,271 0.31 290,000 35:01
2004 7,572 0.18 120,000 15:01
2003 5,475 0.13 87,000 16:01
Table 2.1: China’s National Civil Service Exam. Development of applicants and avail-
able posts (own illustration, adapted from: www.eol.cn, 2016)
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Regarding the ﬁerce competition for government posts, it is hardly surprising that cases
of corruption and cheating occur. In 2008 alone, around 1,000 cases of cheating during
the exam were been uncovered (Burns and Wang, 2010). Corruption is another occur-
ring problem during the recruitment process. Burns notes that‘the sale and purchase
of ofﬁcial positions has become a serious problem’ (Burns, 2007; see also: Burns, 2010:
68f, Xue and Zhong, 2012). During the second stage of recruitment, when guanxi (关
系) can inﬂuence the outcome of an interview, the process is relatively open for corrup-
tion. This is especially true for the Provincial Service Exam, which is said to be more
vulnerable to corruption as family networks and connections at local levels are said to
have a greater inﬂuence than contacts at the the central level. The unscientiﬁc content
of the exams is another point of criticism (Ko and Han, 2013).
2.4 Challenges for China’s Civil Service System
According to the World Bank Government Effectiveness Indicator, China is ranked only
at 68th percentile (World Bank, 2017).6 On the one hand, the Indicator suggests that
China is still lacking efﬁciency with an estimated 32 percent of the countries possess-
ing a better worldwide ranking than China; on the other hand, in comparison to the
other four BRICS countries, China ranks the highest, and has also made considerable
improvements from 2013 (percentile rank: 55) up to today (ibid.)7
6The World Bank Group (2017): ”Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment
to such policies”.
7Percentile rank of BRICS countries in 2015: Brazil (48), Russia (48), India (56) China (68), South
Africa (65) (The World Bank Group, 2017).
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Despite visible success in reforming the management of personnel, further enhance-
ment of the efﬁciency of China’s civil service remains an important aspect of China’s
future development; recruitment is a signiﬁcant factor that will determine the success
of this plan. As shown above, large numbers of applicants have resulted in ﬁerce com-
petition for government posts. This popularity of the test might be interpreted as the
result of China’s improved recruitment procedure, a better reward system, and increased
publicity. Nowadays, the civil service offers better remuneration than in the past, the
requirement to have at least two years of work experience for entry-level posts has been
abolished, and modern technology is being used to attract skilled applicants. This de-
velopment might suggest that examining civil service motivation is not an urgent issue,
and indeed, Chinese literature has rarely addressed this subject, but, as Xue and Zhong
claim, why does‘the current civil service system [⋯] [have] its limitations in fostering
the new generation of civil servants that the government needs’ (Xue and Zhong 2012)?
The large numbers of applications do not necessarily reﬂect a public spirit among pub-
lic sector job-seekers. Owing to a high number of applicants, however, the importance
of the public spirit for the efﬁciency of the civil service has been neglected by China’s
public administrators. The fact that a high level of public service spirit among public
servants positively affects the efﬁciency and motivation of public servants has been un-
derestimated (Ko and Han, 2013: 192). Conversely, this means that if civil servants
pursue a career mainly because of personal interest, the quality of the civil service will
be negatively affected.
This claim leads to the research question of this thesis: what is it that actually motivates
China’s prospective civil servants to pursue a career in the civil service? Past research
suggests two contradictory explanations for the ‘public service fever’. The ﬁrst in-
terpretation is that the Chinese are pursuing a career in public service as they seek to
maximize their own beneﬁts, such as job security or vacation pay. According to another
11
interpretation, proponents of the public service motivation theory argue that public ser-
vants obtain a special public service spirit and choose a career in the public service be-
cause they expect the public sector to match with their motivations. In the next chapter,
these contradictory perspectives will be discussed from a theoretical perspective.
12
Chapter 3
Theoretical Background
3.1 Public sector motivation versus
public service motivation
”Public sector motivation’” is not to be equated with ”public service motivation”. Pre-
liminary remarks on the difference between these two terms will help foster a better
understanding of this chapter.
Public sector motivation can be deﬁned as a general motivation of individuals to join
the public sector. The motivations behind this decision can be manifold. Public service
motivation, on the other hand, is a concept that literally refers to‘the desire to serve
public interest and offers an explanation for the reasons why public service activities
take place’ (Gao, 2015). Perry and Wise broadly deﬁned public service motivation as
‘an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely
in public institutions and organizations’ (Perry and Wise, 1990: 368). It is, therefore,
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closely linked to altruism and was later being described as‘an individual’s orientation
to delivering services to people with a purpose to do good for others and society’ (Perry
and Hongehem, 2008: vii).
The aim of this thesis is to explore the public sector motivation of China’s prospective
civil servants. However, the examination of public sector motivation cannot be under-
taken without paying special attention to the concept of public service motivation. In the
past 25 years, for the most part, the motives of individuals to work for the government
have been studied in the name of public service motivation. A wide variety of deﬁni-
tions and attempts at conceptualization have been made, and some evidence for public
service motivation has been produced. Despite the growing literature on public service
motivation and considerable achievements in this direction, the conceptualization is far
from being complete. In fact, it was this popularity that led to many varying interdisci-
plinary attempts to conceptualize public service motivation, which ultimately led to the
elusiveness of the concept today; thus no consensus has been reached on how to deﬁne
and measure public service motivation. This elusiveness causes the blurring of bound-
aries between public servicemotivation and public sector motivation. Many studies have
regarded public service motivation as the only dimension of job choice (Neumann and
Ritz, 2015: 365). As the aim of this thesis is not to measure public service motivation in
the public sector in comparison to the private sector, but rather to investigate the motiva-
tion of students in joining the public service in general, public service motivation in this
study is only being understood as one dimension of public sector motivation. As it will
be shown in this and the following chapter, public service motivation in this thesis will
be equated with altruism and measured with respect to other factors such as extrinsic
factors, intrinsic factors, and prestige.
This chapter forms the theoretical background for this thesis. The ﬁrst section of this
chapter introduces the major assumptions of public service motivation, its origin, devel-
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opment, and remaining ambiguities. In the course of this section, it will be shown why
public service motivation is only taken as one dimension of public sector motivation
amongst others and not as the ultimate dimension that determines public sector choice.
The second section depicts the peculiarities of the Chinese context and shows the limita-
tions of the adaption of public service motivation across different cultural settings. This
section will provide the background to formulate informed hypotheses in the following
chapter.
Theoretically, the assumption that public servants have unique career-choice motives
contrasts with the claims of the New Public Management (NPM). Based on assumptions
from the rational-choice theory, the NPM perceives all individuals as self-interested
and personal-utility maximizing decision-makers, who seek maximal beneﬁts (Lyons,
Duxbury, and Higgins, 2006: 605). Economists claim that public servants‘are mainly
attracted to the public sector by good employment conditions, high job security and low
(and difﬁcult) monitoring of individual performance’ (Van der Walle et al., 2015: 834).
These contrasting views are the focal point of an ongoing debate on public sector choice:
one stream researching job sector choice considers public service motivation as the only
dimension to determine sector or job choice, whereas another other stream includes other
incentives such as extrinsic and intrinsic rewards as sector choice determinants.
The term‘public servicemotivation’ has gained increased attention since Perry andWise
published their seminal essay‘TheMotivational Bases of Public Service’ in 1990. This
essaywas published against the background of a public service crisis in theUnited States.
At the core of this crisis was a decline in public trust towards the public service, which
was perceived as overly bureaucratic and ineffective. In consideration of this situation,
Perry and Wise connected the crisis of public service directly to the motivation of public
servants:
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“Calls for a recommitment of Americans to values associated with govern-
ment service, among them personal sacriﬁce and duty to the public interest,
raise practical questions about the power of these values to stimulate and direct
human behavior. At their core, calls for a renewal of public service motiva-
tion assume the importance of such motivations for an effective and efﬁcient
public service.”(Perry and Wise, 1990: 367).
Six years later, Perry advanced the concepts and offered an instrument to measure public
service motivation. He found that public servants are uniquely (i) attracted to policy-
making, (ii) committed to the public interest, (iii) have compassion, and (iv) are prone
to putting others interests before personal interest. A strong agreement with these di-
mensions ensures a high degree of public service motivation. Since then, the literature
on public service motivation has grown signiﬁcantly, but after 27 years of extensive re-
search, there is still a ”considerable amount [of] ambiguity in regard to the meaning of
public service motivation”, as Gao states (2015: 10).1 No consensus has been reached
on how to deﬁne, operationalize, and measure public service motivation.
Scholars have altered Perry’s conceptualization and the measurement of public service
motives, and have also offered alternative deﬁnitions from several disciplines and re-
search perspectives.2 This popularity has further complicated the conceptualization of
public service motivation, which remains incomplete. In order to clarify how this thesis
understands public service motivation, ﬁrst, it is necessary to show the ambiguities that
1For a systematic literature review on PSM and its growth since 1990, please refer to Ritz (2016), and
Bozeman and Su (2015).
2Perry (1996) has developed a method to measure PSM, which included the following components:
a) attraction to policy-making; b) commitment to the public interest; c) compassion; and d) self-sacriﬁce.
Critique and alternations came from e.g. Brewer, Selden and Facer (2000), Vandenabeele (2007), Lewis
and Frank (2002).
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complicate the understanding of the concept. This study ﬁnds three major ambiguities
that contribute to a concept’s elusiveness.
The ﬁrst ambiguity considers the deﬁnition of public service motivation itself. Perry and
Hondeghem ”like to think of ”public service motivation” as an individual’s orientation
to[wards] delivering services to people with a purpose to do good for others and society”
(Perry and Hondeghem, 2008: Preface). With this deﬁnition, they narrowly conﬁne the
meaning of public service motivation within the semantic scope of altruism; however,
they also acknowledge that besides altruism, extrinsic rewards also attract employees to
the public service (for example: job security, personal beneﬁts, and ﬁxedworking hours).
Rather than being attracted by only one factor, individuals have diverse motivations to
pursue a career in the public sector. In order to clarify the meaning and differentiate
the concept of public service motivation from other concepts, Perry and Hondeghem
assert that a deﬁnition that includes these additional extrinsic motivators is not what
they mean by their concept of public service motivation. They contrast public service
motivation to public sector motivation, with the former excluding other motives besides
altruism, and the latter including them. Perry and Hondeghem’s attempt to distinguish
public service motivation from public sector motivation shows that the aforementioned
ambiguity persists.
A second ambiguity that adds to the elusiveness of public service motivation is that the
concept has not only been sometimes equated and sometimes differentiated with pub-
lic sector motivation (as mentioned above) but it has also been directly equated with
work-related preferences such as pro-social behavior, intrinsic job motivators, or altru-
ism (Bozeman and Su, 2014: 701). Indeed, the differentiation between public service
motivation and altruism appears to be particularly problematic when the deﬁnition of
the concept is being conﬁned to altruist values in the ﬁrst place. This has also been rec-
ognized by Perry and Hondeghem (2008: 4), but their understanding of public service
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motivation does not really help in solving the problem; they state:‘We construe public
service motivation as referring to individual motives that are largely, but not exclusively,
altruistic and are grounded in public institutions” (ibid.).3 This further complicates the
differentiation between public service motivation and altruism, with the latter already
being a vague concept; its similarity to public service motivation becomes clear when
looking at a well-known deﬁnition of altruism, i.e., ”a motivational state with the ulti-
mate goal of increasing another’s welfare” (Batson and Shaw; as cited by Bozeman and
Sum, 2014: 703).
Thirdly (and this is interrelated with the problematic deﬁnition and conceptualization
of public service motivation), there is also no consensus on how to operationalize the
concept. As shown above, Perry and Hondeghem use the most narrow deﬁnition of
public service motivation: ”’public service motivation’ [is] an individual’s orientation
to delivering services to people with a purpose to do good for others and society” (2008:
Preface). Yet, evidence has shown that rather than being motivated by only one factor,
individuals make their decisions based on more complex motivational patterns. The the-
ory of public service motivation is not solely able to explain the motivation for a career
choice in the public sector. As shown later, this ambiguity might have further relevance
in the Chinese context. Instead, multiple motivators inﬂuence the career choice of indi-
viduals. As this thesis does not seek to solely test public service motivation but also to
investigate the motivation of individuals working in the public sector, multiple motiva-
tors are being regarded as possible factors, which determine public sector motivation.
With an awareness of these ambiguities, which cause overlaps between public sector mo-
tivation, public service motivation, and altruism, among others, it is practical to restate
how this thesis understands these concepts and how it relates and differentiates them
3Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise (2010) have shown that PSM is not unique to public organizations.
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from each other: in this thesis, public service motivation is being considered as one di-
mension of public sector motivation. In terms of operationalization and measurement,
it will be equated with altruism and examined among the other factors.
3.2 Investigating the motivation of public servants in a
non-Western context
With the general ambiguities that surround the scholarship on public service motivation,
it is not surprising that the application of public service motivation to non-Western con-
texts also has to deal with a lack of clarity in the conceptualization and measurement
of public service motivation. In extant literature, however, there is a consensus which
suggests that‘the motivation of public service ofﬁcials in non-Western contexts might
be spurred by a range of extrinsic motivations [⋯] or at least by mixed motives ex-
tending beyond just PSM [public service motivation]” (Van der Wal, 2014: 83). Van
der Wal claims that individual public service motivation needs to be connected with a
greater degree of clarity to other factors such as extrinsic or intrinsic motives: ‘public
sector motivation may crowd out or at least co-exist with public service motivation in
the make-up of the motivational spectrum of public sector employees in non-Western
settings” (ibid.). Accordingly, this thesis examines altruism—which is treated as the
determinant of public service motivation—against other factors.
With a large time delay, scholars began to extend research to non-Western societies in
general and North-East Asian countries in particular (especially in Greater China and
Korea). In the past, most studies on public sector motivation have almost exclusively
focused on Western democratic societies. Van der Wal showed that between 1990 (the
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year in which Perry and Wise published their essay) and 2013, 80 percent of all publi-
cations on public service motivation were focused either on the situation in the United
States or in European countries (Van der Wal, 2015: 70). Yet, empirical data from the
results obtained in a Western democratic context are not necessarily applicable to other
cultural and societal settings (Gao, 2015: 39ff). Gao (2015) noted that ”different re-
gions and countries possess different values that constitute public service”. It is only
since 2011 that a new scholarship on public service motivation in the non-Western con-
text has emerged (Van der Wal, 2015: 72). Since then, the number of publications has
considerably increased. In North-East Asia, this new scholarship has questioned the ap-
plicability of Western public service motivation to the particular characteristics of the
region, thus ﬁnding that applying the same understanding and operationalization to the
cultural peculiarities of the region is problematic (Van der Wal, 2015: 80). It can, how-
ever, be noted that while in 2014, when Sun and Gu observed that in literature, ”the
nature of government and associated sociopolitical contexts have not been explicitly ac-
commodated, especially [⋯] [in] the case of China” (Sun and Gu, 2014), this gap has
been bridged in the last three years or so.4
3.3 Intermediate Conclusion
The scholarship on public service motivation has drawn attention to the connection be-
tween public sector motivation and public service efﬁciency. In order to enhance gov-
ernment efﬁciency, it is crucial to ﬁnd the ”right” employees. Public service motivation
scholars claim that the ”right” employee is someone with high public service motiva-
4Notable scholars performing research on public service motivation in China and taking the cultural
context into account are Liu (2009, 2011, 2012, and 2014), Ko (2013 and 2015), and Sun (2015).
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tion. Against this background, many comparative studies have investigated whether
public servants obtain higher public service motivation (the will to do work that makes
a helpful contribution to society) than their private counterparts and have produced ev-
idence supporting that public servants do indeed show higher degrees of public service
motivation.
However, it is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd limitations and research gaps in the aforementioned
ﬁeld of research. Firstly, as shown above, the ambiguity and elusiveness of the concept
of ”public service motivation” and the difﬁculty of differentiating it from other concepts
such as ”altruism” or ”public sector motivation” remains. As noted at the beginning
of this chapter, the aim of this study is not to compare the level of public service mo-
tivation of public and private sector employees. Instead, the objective of this study is
to ﬁnd out the by which factors by which prospective public servants are attracted to
join the public service (public sector motivation). Public service motivation—measured
through the dimension of altruism—will be taken as one factor against extrinsic factors,
intrinsic factors, and prestigious factors. Secondly, past research has largely focused
on incumbent public sector employees; insufﬁcient information exists on public sector
motivation in the next generation of public servants, which is even more true in the case
of East Asia, and in particular, in the case of China.
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Chapter 4
Research Design and Methodology
4.1 Survey Instrument
In order to investigate the complex motives of public sector motivation, studies have
elaborated different sets of job motivators.1 The most comprehensive set came from
Jurkiewicz et al., who used ﬁfteen work-related motivational items, which included ex-
trinsic factors such as ”high salary” and ”a stable and secure future”, intrinsic factors
such as the ”chance to use [one’s] special abilities” and a ”variety in work assignments”,
and items that can be assigned to the categories of altruism and prestige as well as social
work values (Jurkiewicz et al., 1998). In a later study, Lyons et al. used a very similar list
of factors, assigning items into four categories: extrinsic and intrinsic factors, altruism,
and prestige (Lyons et al., 2006). After a literature review on job motivators, the scales
of Jurkiewicz and Lyons et al. were chosen as references for this thesis’ operationaliza-
1For an overview of the motivational factors used in several studies, please refer to Ko (2012: 137).
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tion as they not only offer the most comprehensive list of factors but also as these items
that they used to survey public servants are, after introducing minor changes, applicable
to the Chinese context. Aside from this, the list of Lyons et al. is also easy to understand
can also be used to examine the public service motivation of individuals at the pre-entry
level.
4.2 Independent Variables and Hypotheses
Four job motivators are the independent variables. Aside from (i) altruism, which will
be the determinant of public service motivation against the other factors, (ii) extrinsic
factors, (iii) intrinsic factors, and (iv) prestige are the independent variables to determine
why Chinese people chose a career in the civil service. Very little evidence for job sector
motivation in people exists before they become public servants. As most of the existing
evidence has been acquired by Kilkon Ko, his ﬁndings have been used as a reference
in this section. In the following section, each job motivator will be introduced. In the
course of this introduction, hypotheses will be developed.
4.2.1 Extrinsic motivators
Extrinsic rewards include salary, job security, and other beneﬁts such as a vacation or a
pension plan. Crewson deﬁnes extrinsic rewards as ”rewards given to the individual by
someone else” (2007: 501). Studies have shown that public servants are risk-averse and
tend to highly value security (Bellante and Link, 1981), especially towards the beginning
of their careers (Burmann et al., 2012). Studies have produced evidence suggesting that
extrinsic motivation also plays a very more important role in non-Western settings (Van
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der Wal, 2014). Recently, Ko and Han have shown ”that a stable and promising future,
[the] chance to exercise leadership, [the] chance to beneﬁt society, high prestige and
social status as well as high salary are the most important motivators [⋯] [for] public
sector job-seekers”. In their study, ”a stable and promising future” was ranked as the
factor of highest importance by Chinese students who chose a public sector career (Ko
and Han, 2013). In addition, in Ko and Jun’s comparative analysis on job motivation and
the career preferences of Asian undergraduate students, ”a stable and promising future”
was ranked as the most important job motivator of prospective public servants (Ko and
Jun, 2013). Especially in times of economic transition and socioeconomic changes,
the public sector has strong extrinsic rewards to offer. Although the new Civil Service
Law abandoned the guarantee of long-life employment (铁饭碗) in 2005, the risk to be
dismissed is still very low (Ko and Jun, 2013). Job security, a stable income as well as
other personal beneﬁts can, therefore, be expected to be the most important motivators.
This might be even more important at the pre-entry level. Most often, young people
do not have relevant work experience, and therefore, lack clear a perception of their
respective job sectors. It is, therefore, conceivable that they place a lot of emphasis on
extrinsic rewards. This leads to the ﬁrst two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: People pursue a career in the civil service primarily because of
extrinsic factors.
Hypothesis 1b: Job security will be the most important public sector job motiva-
tor.
In the questionnaire used in this study, the following items are used to measure extrinsic
motivation:
1. Having beneﬁts that meet my personal beneﬁts (vacation pay, health insurance,
pension plan, etc.)
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2. Having the assurance of Job security
3. Doing work that guarantees a good salary
4.2.2 Intrinsic motivators
In contrast to extrinsic rewards, intrinsic rewards are‘rewards individuals give to them-
selves for successfully performing a task” (Crewson, 2007: 501); these include the op-
portunity to do challenging and stimulating work, using one’s creativity, and learning
new things. Intrinsic motivation is important for job satisfaction because intrinsically-
motivated employees become satisﬁed by successfully accomplishing certain tasks (Kalle-
berg, 1977: 135). With the rather negative image of public sector work, it can be ex-
pected that intrinsic motivators play a rather insigniﬁcant role for the applicants; this
has also been found in Ko’s aforementioned studies. In the questionnaire, the following
items are assigned to intrinsic motivation:
1. Doing work that allow me to use my abilities and my knowledge
2. Doing interesting work
3. Learning new things
4. Doing work that is intellectually stimulating
4.2.3 Altruism
As previously depicted, the meaning of altruism overlaps with public service motiva-
tion as well as public sector motivation. Owing to this ambiguity, altruism is not only a
work-related job motivator but also the determinant of public service motivation. As the
25
concept of public service motivation has already been introduced above, a further intro-
duction of this job motivator is not necessary. Altruism is measured with the following
items:
1. Doing work that makes a helpful contribution to society
2. Doing work that is consistent with my moral values
3. Helping to implement policies and programs that are fairness and impartiality
4.2.4 Prestige
Several studies have pointed out the importance of Confucianism as a decisive factor
that changes the meaning of public spirit and public service motivation in the Chinese
context (Liu, 2011; Van der Wal, 2014; Ko and Han, 2013). For thousands of years,
Confucianism has inﬂuenced the people’s attitude towards the government. In Confu-
cianism philosophy, studying enjoys a high esteem: ”the worth of other pursuits is small,
the study of books excels them all” (万般皆下品，惟有读书高). By linking the public
service occupation to an excellence in studying, a career as an ofﬁcial is being perceived
as the ultimate goal: ”those who excel in studying can become an ofﬁcial（学而优则
仕）” (Su and Gu, 2014: 4). Sun and Gu state:
“These sociocultural values combined with the power distance and hierarchi-
cal nature of the society underpin the ultimate career goal of Confucianism as
a desire to‘glorify and illuminate one’s family and ancestors (光宗耀祖)’
by working for the government.”(2014: 4)
Public sector careers can, therefore, be expected to be considered as prestigious profes-
sional paths. This has been conﬁrmed in a study by Ko and Jun, who examined public
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service motivation among Chinese, Singaporean, and Korean students, and found that
public servants put a strong emphasis on prestige as a job motivator. In order to ﬁnd out
to what degree Chinese public servants at the pre-entry level value prestige against the
other job motivators, the following items have been included:
1. Having the authority to organize and direct others
2. Doing work that is prestigious and regarded highly by others
3. Having work that improves my standing in the society
Besides these public sector motivators, public sector motivation is also controlled for
two demographic variables. These are introduced in the following section.
4.3 Demographic variables
Furthermore, it can be expected that the individual background of the participants inﬂu-
ence their motivation in joining the public sector. In this thesis, gender and household
registration are used as control variables.
Gender. Some evidence from surveys conducted inWestern settings suggest that women
have a higher public service motivation (attracted by the altruist motives) than men (Naff
and Crum, 1999), and that they are more strongly motivated by intrinsic factors (which
refers to doing meaningful work) (Houston, 2000). In the Korean context, studies have
found that women are more strongly attracted by intrinsic motivators than men (Kim,
2005). Other studies, however, did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant variance in gender-dependent
public service motivation (DeHart-Davis, Marlowe, and Pandy, 2006). In the Chinese
context, for instance, this phenomenon has been detected by Liu et al. (2012). Overall,
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ﬁndings on gender differences in public sector motivation between women and men, es-
pecially in the Chinese context and with regard to the pre-entry level, are almost nonex-
istent. Although the results on public sector motivation will be controlled for gender, I
am aware that the validity will be limited due to a biased sample towards female partic-
ipants.
Hypothesis 2: There will be no signiﬁcant differences in public sector motivation be-
tween male and female public sector job-seekers.
Hukou. (户口). China’s household registration system was implemented in the late
1950s with the objective of curbing down the effects of massive migration from the
countryside to urban areas. Every Chinese citizen either has an agricultural registration
(农民户口) or an urban registration (居民户口). This system determines where a citizen
lives, where he has to go to school, where he works, and if he gets health insurance.
This policy has been successful in tackling the typical problems of developing countries
such as the emergence of slums in urban areas. It has, however, been criticized for
discriminating against the non-urban population. In 2014, the government announced
to comprehensively reform the system until 2020. As non-urban citizens who become
civil servants are given the chance to apply for a urban registration, it can be expected
that participants with a rural registration are more strongly motivated to work in the
public service because of extrinsic factors, especially owing to the chance of ”hav[ing]
beneﬁts that meet personal beneﬁts (vacation pay, health/dental insurance, pension plan,
etc.)” (Item 1). (For results, please refer to pages x and y).
Hypothesis 3: Public sector job seekers with a rural Hukou registration will be more
strongly motivated by extrinsic factors than those with an urban Hukou registration.
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4.4 Sample and Data Collection
To examine the motivation of China’s prospective civil servants, I surveyed those who
were already preparing for the interview of the National or the Provincial Civil Service
Exams and/or were taking preparation classes which were subject to charges. Past stud-
ies have solely trusted the statements of people who claimed that they would pursue a
career in the public service. As shown in Table 2, however, even those who enrolled
for the exam did not necessarily take it. In 2016, almost 1.4 million people enrolled for
the national civil service exam, but as many as 460,000 who enrolled for the exam did
not show up. This demonstrates a drop-out rate of 33 percent. It can be expected that
the applicants who have already passed the ﬁrst part of the exam and/or paid substantial
fees for private classes were seriously determined to pursue a career in the civil service.
This study was conducted in Jinan (Shandong Province) and Taiyuan (Shanxi Province),
but not conﬁned to the participants from these two provinces. In addition, in contrast to
other studies, this study did not choose a sample group that consisted of students from
the political science departments of top universities. The few studies on job sector moti-
vation in the East Asian context have argued that political science students have a better
understanding of the civil service and were thus chosen as a sample group (for example:
Ko and Han, 2013). On the contrary, I argue that choosing such an exclusive sample
group is not only unnecessary when the aim is to ﬁnd out about public sector motivation
among prospective civil servants but it might also lead to biased results. Students from
political science departments who take the civil service exam account for only a small
share of the total number of applicants. Studies that conﬁned their sample to students
from a certain major, therefore, cannot rightfully claim to produce representative results
for public sector motivation among China’s prospective civil servants in general.
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A printed version as well as an online version was prepared to conduct the survey. In
order to avoidmisunderstandings due to linguistic problems, the questionnaire was trans-
lated into Chinese by a Chinese native speaker who teaches English as a second language
at Shandong University in Jinan. After the translation, it was double-checked by two
Chinese native speakers, who were both ﬂuent in English.
The survey was conducted in December 2016 and January 2017. All the participants
were informed that their participation was anonymous and voluntary. In total, 98 copies
were valid and usable. The data was collected in three ways. Firstly, the copies were
distributed during an on-campus preparation course at Jinan’s Shandong University. In
this course, the students were preparing for the interview stage of the civil service exam.
This guaranteed that all the participants had already passed the ﬁrst part of the exam.
Twenty-one copies were distributed, of which 100 percent were returned and were valid.
Secondly, I went to the Jinan and the Taiyuan ofﬁces of Zhonggong jiaoyu (中公教育),
which is one of the biggest providers of civil servant preparation courses in China. Both
ofﬁces agreed to share the link of my online survey, which I had prepared on Wen-
juanwang (问卷网). The link was shared in Wechat (微信) groups, which consisted
of applicants who also were preparing for the second part of the civil servant exams.
Eighty-one people ﬁlled out the online survey, out of which four questionnaires were
not valid as signiﬁcant information was missing. Another three people initially agreed
to ﬁll out the questionnaire, but then mentioned in the group chat that they would not
ﬁnish it as they found the third part of the questionnaire (”Personal Information”) too
personal.
The questionnaire consisted of three parts. The ﬁrst part asked the participants to indi-
cate the degree of agreement with each of the 13 public sector motivators (as introduced
in the previous section) on a Likert-scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
The only dependent variable was public sector motivation. As shown, independent vari-
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ables included extrinsic, intrinsic, and altruist job motivators as well as prestige. In the
second part of the questionnaire, participants indicated the role that parents played in
their decision to become civil servants. Furthermore, they were asked to indicate the
degree of the external factor’s inﬂuence on their decision to pursue a career in the civil
service. Eventually, this part was not used in this study as it became clear that it would
go beyond the scope and aim of this study. The last part of the questionnaire asked the
participants to provide personal details about themselves and their family background.
Table xxx summarizes the descriptive statistics of this part.
Aside from quantitative data from a survey, written follow-up and semi-structured in-
terviews with two survey participants were conducted in May and June 2017. Questions
were asked via a private chat on Wechat. This method had several advantages. Firstly, it
helped overcome miscommunication in verbal language; nevertheless, I am aware that
the possibility of spontaneous answers was thereby limited and the interviewees might
have answered more carefully and even more strategically than they would have in case
of face-to-face interviews. The second advantage of this method was in regard to time
and cost. Owing to these limitations, conducting face-to-face interviews was not possi-
ble andwritten interviewswere the onlymeans to realize these interviews. Video calling,
my preferred method, was rejected by the interviewees and was thus not feasible.
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4.5 Descriptive Statistics of the sample
Among the 98 participants, the majority was from the Shandong Province and the Shanxi
Province (accounting for 77.6 percent in total).2 Regarding household registration, this
sample is slightly biased towards urban hukou residents (城市户口). This might, how-
ever, be a reﬂection of unequal distribution of diverse populations in Chinese universi-
ties. According to the People’s Daily’s report from 2012, the share of survey participants
with a rural household registration was 30 percent at Zhejiang University (浙江大学)
and Nanjing University (南京大学); in China’s top school, Tsinghua University (清华
大学), it was even lower at 15 percent (Cao, 2012).
In terms of gender, the sample is strongly unbalanced. In 2015’s National Civil Service
Exam, 53.01 percent of the enrolled test takers were male (Sohu, 2015). With a pro-
portion of 75.5 percent women, therefore, this study is strongly biased towards female
applicants.
Regarding age, the majority of the participants were born between 1992 and 1995 (68.4
percent). In total, 26.5 percent of the participants indicated that one of their parents was
working in the civil service and 37.8 percent of the participants had at least one parent
with a university degree.
2Outside the aforementioned provinces, participants were from Hebei (3 participants), Heilongjiang
(2 participants), Henan (2 participants) as well as Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Hainan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner
Mongolia, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Tianjin, Xinjiang, and Zhejiang (one participant from each province).
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Gender Frequency %
Female 74 75.5
Male 24 24.5
Year of birth
before 1992 25 25.5
between 1992 and 1995 67 68.4
after 1995 6 6.1
Household Registration
Urban Hukou 55 56.1
Rural Hukou 43 43.9
Education parents Mother (Father)
Middle school or below 42 (40) 42.9 (40.8)
Highschool 30 (28) 30.6 (28.6)
University or above 26 (30) 26.5 (30.6)
At least one parent obtaining a university degree?
Yes 37 37.8
No 61 62.2
Birthplace (province)
Shandong 49 50
Shanxi 27 27.6
Other 23 23.4
At least one of the parents working in the civil service?
Yes 26 26.5
No 72 73.5
Exam type
National exam 53 51.4
Provincial exam 41 41
Missing 4 4.1
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the sample
Chapter 5
Analysis results
5.1 Quantitative data: survey
5.1.1 Reliability
The data was analysed by using the SPSS 13 software. As repeating the survey in a sec-
ond round was not feasible, the internal consistency of the public sector motivation scale
was tested by performing a reliability analysis, namely, Cronbach’s Alpha. Cronbach’s
Alpha assumes that a scale is deemed to be consistent if α ≥ 0.7. This is the case for the
scale used to measure public sector motivation (α = 0.801) (see Table 5.1).
Cronbach’s Alpha
Cronbach’s Alpha Based
on Standardized Items
N of Items
.801 .798 13
Table 5.1: Cronbach’s Alpha results
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In the second step, descriptive studies were run to extract the mean, the standard devia-
tions as well as the answer distribution for all the thirteen items (Table xx). Following
this, four dimension variables were computed from these 13 items (extrinsic motivators,
intrinsic motivators, altruism, and prestige) to get the mean and the standard deviation
of the four dimensions (Table xxx). In the last step, an independent-sample t-test was
conducted to control for gender and household registration.
5.1.2 Public Sector Motivation
Overall, the results suggest that China’s prospective civil servants are primarily moti-
vated by extrinsic factors. The mean of the three extrinsic motivators is M = 3.89 (Table
5.2). Two of the three extrinsic motivators received the highest approval among all the
items (Table 5.3). As many as 93.7 percent of the participants indicated agreement (53.3
percent) or strong agreement (40.4 percent) towards ”having the assurance of job se-
curity” (Item 2), which has the highest mean (M = 4.35). This is followed by ”having
beneﬁts that meet my personal needs” (Item 1). A strong agreement towards the item
covering ”Personal Beneﬁts” (60.6 percent and 30.3 percent, respectively) was observed
in 90.9 percent of the participants. One extrinsic factor, however, fell far behind the other
two: ”Doing work that guarantees a good salary” was indicated as the least important
(Item 3; M =3.17) extrinsic motivator. Only 33.3 percent agreed that a good salary was
a public sector motivator. Among all the job motivators, this item ranks second from the
bottom. The data indicates that Hypothesis 1a cannot be rejected. People pursue a career
in the civil service primarily because of extrinsic factors. In addition, the data suggests
that job security constitutes the most important form motivation to join the civil service.
Hypothesis 1b, therefore, cannot be rejected.
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N Mean Std. Deviation
Extrinsic job motivation 98 3.8912 0.55567
Altruism 98 3.8741 0.65193
Prestige 98 3.6973 0.67365
Intrinsic job motivation 98 3.199 0.69605
Valid N (listwise) 98
Table 5.2: Dimensions of public sector motivation
The overall mean of altruist motivation (M = 3.87) closely follows extrinsic motivation.
Among the three altruist motivators ”Doing work that makes a helpful contribution to
society” (Item 8) ranks the highest. Besides the two top extrinsic motivators, ”Doing
work that makes a helpful contribution to society” is the only item with a mean higher
than 4.0 (M = 4.01). In total, 83.9 percent of the participants indicated agreement with
this item. The other two items, ”Doing work that is consistent with my moral values”
and ”Helping to implement policies and programs that are guided by fairness and im-
partiality” rank ﬁfth and seventh, respectively.
While prestige as dimension of public sector motivation also receives relatively high
agreement (M = 3.70) with ”Doing work that is prestigious and regarded highly by oth-
ers” (Item 12, rank 4, M = 3.85), intrinsic factors do not appear to be of importance as a
public service motivator (M = 3.20). ”Doing interesting work” (Item 5) ranks last with
a mean of M = 2.92. Only four percent indicated strong agreement and 19.2 percent
agreed with this item. In addition, ”Doing work that is intellectually stimulating” (Item
7) is positioned in the third last rank (M = 3.17).
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1 2 3 4 5 Mean (M)
Standard
Deviation (SD)
Having the assurance of job security (item 2) 0.00% 1.00% 4.00% 53.50% 40.40% 4.35 0.611
Having beneﬁts that meet my personal needs
(vacation pay, health insurance, pension plan, etc.) (item 1)
1.00% 1.00% 6.10% 60.60% 30.30% 4.19 0..684
.
Doing work that is consistent with my moral values (item 9) 1.00% 5.10% 18.20% 60.60% 14.10% 3.83 0.774
Having work that improves my standing in the society (item 13) 1.00% 5.10% 21.20% 55.60% 16.20% 3.82 0.804
Helping to implement policies and programs that are fairness and impartiality (item 10) 1.00% 4.00% 29.30% 45.50% 19.20% 3.79 0.84
Learning new things (item 6) 2.00% 9.10% 32.30% 48.50% 7.10% 3.5 0.84
Having the authority to organize and direct others (item 11) 3.00% 15.20% 27.30% 43.40% 10.10% 3.43 0.974
Doing work that allow me to use my abilities and my knowledge (item 4)
3.00% 15.20% 45.50% 29.30% 6.10% 3.2 0.885
Doing work that is intellectually stimulating (item 7) 5.10% 17.20% 36.40% 36.40% 4.00% 3.17 0.942
Doing work that guarantees a good salary (item 3) 3.00% 25.30% 37.40% 22.20% 11.10% 3.13 1.022
Table 5.3: Public sector job motivators
5.1.3 Controlling Demographic Variables: Gender and Hukou
Independent-samples t-tests were performed to control gender and Hukou, and thereby
to test Hypothesis 2: ”There will be no signiﬁcant differences in public sector motivation
betweenmale and female public sector job seekers” and Hypothesis 3: ”Public sector job
seekers with a rural Hukou registration will be stronger motivated by extrinsic factors
than those with a urban Hukou registration”. The following decision rule was applied:
if p ≤ 0.05, the difference is statistically signiﬁcant (i.e., the level of agreement with a
motivational dimension (extrinsic, intrinsic, altruism, and prestige)). If p > 0.05, the
difference is statistically not signiﬁcant (and the level of agreement does not differ).
Gender. The results of the independent-samples t-test on gender suggest that there was
no signiﬁcant gender-related difference in any of the four dimensions of public sector
motivation (Table 5.4 and Appendix A). Hypothesis 2, therefore, cannot be rejected.
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Extrinsic Female 74 3.8694 0.47404 0.05511
Male 24 3.9583 0.76337 0.15582
Intrinsic Female 74 3.1959 0.65855 0.07655
Male 24 3.2083 0.8165 0.16667
Altruism Female 74 3.6622 0.67233 0.07816
Male 24 3.8056 0.68041 0.13889
Prestige Female 74 3.6577 0.57065 0.06634
Male 24 3.7778 0.69273 0.1414
Table 5.4: Group statistics gender: dimensions of public sector motivation
Hukou. Results on Hukou registration suggest no statistically signiﬁcant differences in
the scores between urban Hukou (M = 3.87, SD = 0.53) and rural Hukou holders (M =
3.92, SD = 0.59) when it comes to the degree of extrinsic motivation; t(96) = −0.492, p
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= 0.624 (Table 5.5 and Appendix B). This data, therefore, provides support to reject the
third Hypothesis.
Household Registration N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Extrinsic Motivation
Urban Hukou 55 3.8667 0.52744 0.07112
Rural Hukou 43 3.9225 0.59467 0.09069
Table 5.5: Group statistics hukou: extrinsic motivation
5.2 Qualitative Data: Follow-up Interviews
In many aspects, the follow-up interviews conﬁrmed the quantitative results. All the
interviewees emphasized the importance of job security as the most decisive motivator
to choose a career in the civil service. In addition, statements were made that can be
classiﬁed in the category of ”Having personal beneﬁts”. For instance, Interviewee 2
brought up annual paid holidays, which would allow her to travel once a year. She also
praised social welfare and other beneﬁts, such as the eligibility for a housing fund and a
pension. She added that in the third- or fourth-tier city she lives in, career opportunities
in jobs that offer such beneﬁts were quite rare.
With regard to intrinsic motivation, the interviewees conﬁrmed that they were not moti-
vated to work as public servants because they could do intellectually stimulating work.
This is in accordance with the quantitative results;, it can, however, also be observed
that ”Doing interesting work”, an intrinsic motivator, which ranked last among all pub-
lic sector motivators in the survey (M = 2.92, SD = 0.9), has been put into context by
the interviewees: although the interviewees indicated that interest in the work is not an
important factor in inﬂuencing their decision to become civil servants (only 23.3 per-
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cent indicated agreement with this item), it is notable that some aspects of the work,
nevertheless, were actually indicated as interesting—most importantly, it would offer
the interviewees the opportunity to serve the people. By this statement, the interviewees
made a connection between an intrinsic factor and altruism.
Altruism—or public service motivation—was mentioned multiple times by the intervie-
wees as a decisive factor for their public sector motivation. They stated that the work
was consistent with their moral values, and as mentioned before, the chance to serve
their country and their people was an important factor for their decision to pursue a civil
service career. Only one interviewee noted that doing work that was consistent with his
moral values was not a decisive factor in inﬂuencing their decision to become a civil
servant. One interviewee, once again, established the connection with altruism and the
intrinsic factor ”Doing interesting work”. For her, it was okay if the work was slightly
boring as long as she could serve the people. Overall, altruism as a factor for public
sector motivation played a considerable role for the interviewees.
With respect to prestige, it was mentioned that civil servants still have a high standing
and their work is being perceived as honorable because they serve the people as well
as their proximity to power. Two interviewees connected prestige to the reputation that
civil servants enjoyed in the past. This reputation still inﬂuences how people perceive
civil servants today. One aspect that was not captured by the questionnaire was related to
work-life balance and leisure time. For Interviewee 1a, a job in the public sector gives
her the opportunity to balance her work with her family and her child. Interviewee 2
provided an even clearer stance: for her, working as a civil servant allowed her to enjoy
her life. According to her, as civil servants barely work extra hours, they are able to
freely arrange their pastimes. This also provides the opportunity to study new things
in a civil servant’s free time. Having the opportunity to continuously work on oneself,
according to Interviewee 2, is more important than a good salary.
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Another aspect that was emphasized in the interviews was the parental and the family
inﬂuence on the decision to become civil servants. This is in accordance with results
of the questionnaire. The participants were asked to answer a simple single-answer
question about the involvement of the parents in the decision-making of the participants
(Appendix C). Indeed, while 41.2 percent have indicated that they made their decision
by themselves, there were 52.6 percent who stated a greater or lesser degree of parental
involvement in reaching the decision to become a civil servant.
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Chapter 6
Discussion and Limitations
With regard to the different dimensions of public sector motivation, it can be seen that
as expected and phrased in Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the results conﬁrm the earlier studies
which claimed that prospective civil sector employees highly value extrinsic factors, es-
pecially job security. In this study, job security not only ranks ﬁrst among all items but it
was also emphasized in every follow-up interview. Burmann et al. (2012) have shown
that public servants are risk-averse and attach high importance to security, especially
towards the beginning of their careers. In China, where the last few decades brought
profound socioeconomic changes, which led to the end of the ”Iron rice bowl” and in-
troduced market-based competition, employment has become increasingly competitive
with the result that Chinese college graduates face enormous unemployment pressures.
In 2009, over 7 million graduates remained unemployed (Ross, 2013). It is, therefore,
not surprising that job security is an important factor that drives people to pursue a civil
service career. The results of the follow-up interviews suggest that for similar reasons,
personal beneﬁts such as vacation pay, health insurance, and a pension plan play an im-
portant role for the public sector job choice. Becoming a civil servant offers a chance
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to live a stable life. Owing to the discriminating character of the urban–rural dichotomy
and the disadvantages faced by rural hukou holders, I expected public sector job-seekers
with a rural Hukou registration to more strongly pursue a public sector career than ur-
ban Hukou holders because of the extrinsic factors of the public sector. However, this
hypothesis has been rejected. There was no signiﬁcant difference between prospective
public servants with urban or rural registrations. While job security and personal bene-
ﬁts are important factors for choosing a career in the public sector, the salary paid in the
public sector does not decisively attract people.
Besides of extrinsic factors, altruism plays a crucial role for China’s prospective civil
servants. This result conﬁrms the claims of former public service motivation studies.
For China’s future public sector employees, it appears to be of great importance to do
work that makes a helpful contribution to society. This is important for practitioners
in China’s public personnel management. Finding the ”right” future public sector em-
ployee cannot be guaranteed by solely counting on high applicant numbers. As noted
before, the ”right employee” needs to have a high level of public service motivation.
Studies on public service motivation have shown that if job seekers only pursue a career
because of personal interest, then the negative effects for public service efﬁciency can
be expected. On the contrary, when public servants are motivated by their will to do
good for the society, positive impacts on the efﬁciency of the civil service system are
likely. The results of this study provide public personnel administrators a good reason
to be optimistic about the future development of China’s service-oriented public sector.
With regard to the intrinsic factors, this study ﬁnds that applicants do not expect the
public sector to offer stimulating or interestingwork. Intrinsicmotivators rank far behind
the other three dimensions of public sector motivation. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the ﬁndings of Ko and Jun (2015) in their comparative study on Asian undergraduate
students. It is conceivable that enhancing the intrinsic rewards would attract more job
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seekers, who would otherwise seek private sector employment. The interviewees have
conﬁrmed quantitative results, claiming that they do not think that public sector work is
as dynamic and interesting as private sector employment.
However, there is a third factor besides extrinsic and altruist motives, which induces
Chinese people to join the civil service: prestige plays a considerable role for China’s
prospective civil servants. This constitutes a major difference in comparison to many
Western societies, where the public sector has a negative reputation (Light, 1999: 129)
or neutral reputation at best (Luoma-aho, 2007). This can possibly be traced back to
the lingering inﬂuence of Confucianism on people’s attitudes towards the public sec-
tor—despite the many and widely-known cases of corruption in China’s governmental
institutions as well as the perception of public sector work as not being challenging,
stimulating, or interesting. One interviewee established a connection between prestige
and altruism, claiming that the public sector was perceived as prestigious because its
ultimate aim was serving the people.
Overall, the results suggest that the extrinsic and the altruist factors are the most im-
portant public sector motivators for China’s prospective public servants. While prestige
also plays a considerable role in the decisions directing Chinese citizens towards pursu-
ing a public sector career, future public sector employees are not attracted by intrinsic
factors.
The ﬁndings from this study make several contributions to the current literature. These
ﬁndings provide additional evidence with respect to the scholarship of public sector mo-
tivation and public service motivation. It complements the ﬁndings of earlier studies,
especially with regard to the Chinese context. By being the ﬁrst study on the public sec-
tor motivation of China’s prospective civil servants, it assists in a better understanding of
why such a large number of people attend China’s highly competitive civil service exam
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to gain a governmental post. It is also the ﬁrst study that focuses on prospective civil
servants who have already passed the ﬁrst part of the civil service exam. This guarantees
that the sample consists of applicants who are truly determined to join the civil service
rather than those who simply claim that they will pursue a career in this sector.
However, this study also comes with several limitations. Firstly, the relatively small
sample size might lead to biased results. This might be the case when it comes to sta-
tistical comparisons between groups, as it seen in this study with the independent sam-
ples t-tests while controlling for gender and Hukou. The reason behind why no signif-
icant differences have been found between male and female public sector job-seekers
as well as between rural and urban Hukou holders might lie in the limited explanatory
power of this small sample size. Secondly, external factors have only been queried by
a single-answer question about the involvement of parents on career decision-making.
Yet, other external factors such as friends, media, and the learning environment, among
others, might be important factors that inﬂuence career decision-making. More research
is needed to better understand external inﬂuence on job sector decision-making. Lastly,
the interviews revealed that motivational factors might have been neglected in the ap-
plied questionnaire. This became apparent when one interviewee made clear that her
motivation stemmed from the fact that in the public sector, she would have ﬁxed work-
ing hours, generally more pastime, and less pressure in comparison to private sector
employees. These limitations are also a starting point for further research. Research
with a larger sample size can achieve even more reliable results.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
What attracts people to pursue a career in the civil service? Is it self-interest and personal-
utility maximizing as the New Public Management suggests? Or do public servants ob-
tain a public service spirit which induces them to pursue a career that would allow them
to do work in a ﬁeld that is beneﬁcial for society? This study set out to answer these
questions and by doing so it aimed to explain the socioeconomic phenomenon of China’s
civil service exam, where, every year, millions of job seekers compete for government
jobs. Quantitative as well as qualitative results suggest that the most decisive factors that
drive applicants to pursue a career in the civil service are of an extrinsic nature. It can be
observed that China’s public sector job-seekers highly value job security. However, it
would be an oversimpliﬁcation to assume that the extrinsic dimension solely determines
public sector career decisions. The results of this study show that altruist motives and
prestige are also important public sector motivators. Neither the New Public Manage-
ment nor the concept of PSM can solely explain why an individual pursues a career in the
civil service. Instead, the decision to pursue a career in the public sector is affected by
multiple factors. The large numbers of applicants for China’s annual civil service exam
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comes about not only because the public sector offers personal beneﬁts but also, to a
slightly lesser degree, because it embodies altruistic values and because it is regarded as
a prestigious career path by many Chinese people. Taken together, these ﬁndings can be
positively considered by China’s public personnel managers. Future public servants who
seek a job in the civil service not only do so because of personal beneﬁt maximization
but also because of altruism, among other reasons.
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APPENDIX A: Independent samples t-test: Gender
Levene’s Test
for Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality
of Means
F Sig. t df
Sig.
(2-tailed)
Mean Difference Std. Error Difference
95% Conﬁdence
Interval of the Difference
Lower Upper
Extrinsic Equal variances assumed 2.963 0.088 -0.68 96 0.498 -0.08896 0.13089 -0.34878 0.17085
Equal variances not assumed -0.538 28.97 0.595 -0.08896 0.16528 -0.42701 0.24908
Intrinsic Equal variances assumed 2.277 0.135 -0.075 96 0.94 -0.01239 0.16435 -0.33862 0.31384
Equal variances not assumed -0.068 33.262 0.947 -0.01239 0.18341 -0.38542 0.36065
Altruism Equal variances assumed 0.148 0.702 -0.905 96 0.368 -0.14339 0.15839 -0.4578 0.17101
Equal variances not assumed -0.9 38.652 0.374 -0.14339 0.15937 -0.46584 0.17906
Prestige Equal variances assumed 0.391 0.533 -0.849 96 0.398 -0.12012 0.14145 -0.40089 0.16065
Equal variances not assumed -0.769 33.723 0.447 -0.12012 0.15619 -0.43763 0.19739
APPENDIX B: Independent samples t-test: Hukou
Levene’s Test
for Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality
of Means
F Sig. t df
Sig.
(2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std.
Error
Difference
95% Conﬁdence
Interval of the Difference
Lower Upper
Extrinsic Equal variances assumed 0.176 0.676 -0.492 96 0.624 -0.05581 0.11356 -0.28122 0.1696
Equal variances not assumed -0.484 84.646 0.629 -0.05581 0.11525 -0.28497 0.17334
APPENDIX C: Parent’s inﬂuence on decision-making
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
I alone made this choice 40 40.8 41.2
My parents and me discussed my career choice and we decided on equal terms 35 35.7 36.1
My parents and me discussed my career choice, but I made the ﬁnal decision 4 4.1 4.1
My parents and me discussed my career choice, but my parents made the ﬁnal decision 10 10.2 10.3
My parents alone made this choice 2 2 2.1
None of the above 6 6.1 6.2
Total 97 99 100
Missing 1 1
Total 98 100
